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Religious Purpose, Inerrancy,
and the Establishment Clause
DANIEL 0. CONKI*
The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine has been attacked
from all quarters. But on one point there is common ground: whatever else
the establishment clause might mean, the Court and its critics agree that
government cannot "prefer one religion over another."' This principle of
religious equality stands as an uncontested first principle, a principle so
obviously sound as to be virtually beyond question.
In this essay, I question the principle of religious equality. I do not
challenge the principle in all, or even most, of its applications. But I do
question the principle as it relates to another, equally basic component of
the Court's doctrine-the prohibition on religiously motivated lawmaking.
More specifically, I distinguish between "inerrant" religion, which is char-
acterized by a certain type of closed-mindedness, and "dialogic" religion,
which is not.2 I contend that inerrant religion presents special dangers to
the lawmaking process, dangers suggesting that lawmaking animated by an
inerrant "religious purpose" should be invalid for that reason alone. By
contrast, the presence of a dialogic "religious purpose" should not neces-
sarily lead to invalidation. In this sense, government should be allowed to
prefer one religion over another, dialogic religion over inerrant religion,
and the establishment clause should be read to endorse this type of religious
preference.
In Part I, I discuss the principle of religious equality. Part II presents
the body of my argument. I suggest a theoretical explanation of the purpose
component of establishment clause doctrine, and I advance my contention
that inerrant and dialogic religious thought should be treated differently.
This argument is controversial, and it is subject to powerful criticisms.
Accordingly, in Part III, I discuss a number of objections that should be
considered before my argument is embraced. In the end, then, I question
not only the principle of religious equality, but also my own argument for
rejecting it. I thus regard this essay as tentative and exploratory in nature;
I mean to open a conversation, not conclude it.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. I am indebted
to Professors Richard Fraher, John H. Garvey, Kent Greenawalt, Stanley Ingber, Michael W.
McConnell, Michael J. Perry, and Steven Douglas Smith for their extensive, thoughtful, and
thought-provoking comments on an earlier version of this essay. I also profited from conver-
sations with Professor Harry Pratter.
I. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
2. I define and explain this terminology in Part II.D.
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I
The familiar test of Lemon v. Kurtzman3 serves as the primary vehicle
for evaluating establishment clause challenges. To survive judicial scrutiny
under Lemon, a statute (or other governmental action) must satisfy each of
three requirements: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion."'' 4 This test embodies
the controversial "no aid" principle that the Supreme Court first announced
in Everson v. Board of Education.5 Thus, the first two prongs of Lemon
declare that government must remain neutral as between religion and irre-
ligion and cannot aid or favor one over the other.6
Implicit in the Lemon test is a second principle, also derived from
Everson-the principle of religious equality. As stated in Everson, govern-
ment "cannot prefer one religion over another." '7 Based on this principle,
the Court has ruled that governmental action preferring certain religions
over others should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.8 The Court's
doctrine thus requires neutrality between religions just as it requires neu-
trality between religion and irreligion. 9
Critics of Everson and Lemon contend that government should be per-
mitted to favor religion over irreligion, and they therefore decry the "no
aid" principle.' 0 But they do not challenge the principle of religious equality.
To the contrary, that principle stands at the center of their "no preference"
alternative to the Court's existing doctrine. Under this alternative, as under
the Court's prevailing approach, government is precluded "from asserting
a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. '"' Even if
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
5. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
6. In testing for the neutrality required by the first two prongs of Lemon, the Court
recently has emphasized the "endorsement or disapproVal" inquiry that Justice O'Connor
initially proposed in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94
(1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985).
7. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
8. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-55 (1982). The Larson Court itself did not
regard its strict scrutiny approach as implicit in the Lemon test; rather, it viewed the strict
scrutiny as a separate means of analysis. Id. at 251-52.
9. "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause," the Court wrote in Larson, "is
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Id. at 244.
10. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
11. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Smith, Nonprefer-
entialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 245 (1991) (discussing possible variants of "no preference" notion).
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Everson and Lemon were to be rejected, therefore, the principle of religious
equality would almost surely remain intact. This principle is so well settled
and so widely supported that most would regard it as axiomatic.' 2
II
The first prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman3 test states a requirement
that laws be grounded on secular as opposed to religious purposes. This
requirement is plagued by significant definitional problems. What makes a
purpose religious in the impermissible sense? And how should we deal with
legislation that is the product of multiple motivations? I shall address these
problems in reverse order.
A
The problem of multiple motivations arises when individual legislators
act for permissible as well as impermissible reasons, and also when some
legislators act for permissible reasons, but others for impermissible. The
Supreme Court has considered the problem of multiple motivations in its
establishment clause cases, although the Court's pronouncements have hardly
resolved the uncertainty in this area. In Lemon itself, the Court stated
simply that a law "must have a secular legislative purpose."11 4 In its initial
creche decision, the Court suggested that this requirement could be easily
satisfied, ruling that the presence of "a" secular purpose is sufficient, even
if that secular purpose is accompanied by a religious purpose as well.
5
Likewise, the Court has held that a law supported by a secular purpose is
12. According to the principle of religious equality,
any form of religious discrimination needs to be seen as incompatible with
religious liberty and should be viewed as no less a violation of the human person
than discrimination that is based on race, national origin, or sex. This is not to
ignore the profound differences in teachings and practices that divide religions
from one another, but these differences are no basis for any form of legal
discrimination between the various religions.
Wood, Religious Pluralism and Religious Freedom, 31 J. CHURCH & STATE 7, 12 (1989). See
generally Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 193
(finding equality principle inherent in establishment clause); Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion,
Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 739, 741-55 (1986) (reading
establishment clause to embody principle of "equal religious liberty"); Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NoTa DAmE L. REv. 311 (1986) (making similar argument).
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Id. at 612.
15. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("The Court has invalidated legislation
or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it
has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by
religious considerations." (citations omitted)); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-
04 (1988).
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not invalid merely because it also "coincides" with religious doctrine.f6
In other establishment clause decisions, however, the Court has addressed
the problem of multiple motivations in language that implies a more
searching judicial inquiry. In its moment-of-silence decision, for example,
the Court stated that the secular purpose supporting a law must be "clearly
secular."1' 7 And its "creation science" opinion suggested that the Court
would invalidate a law whose "primary" purpose was religious, even if a
secular purpose might also be present. 8
These latter cases might be read to reflect an approach like the one the
Court follows in the area of equal protection. In that area, the presence of
multiple motivations does not immunize governmental action from moti-
vational scrutiny. Instead, the governmental action is deemed to be grounded
on a constitutionally impermissible purpose if that purpose was a but-for
factor in the government's decision-making process.' 9 Thus, for example, if
a law would not have been enacted in the absence of a racially discriminatory
motive, that law is regarded as racially discriminatory. 20 So, too, if this
approach were applied to the establishment clause, a law would be deemed
to rest on an impermissible religious purpose if the law would not have
been enacted in the absence of that purpose.
In resolving the problem of multiple motivations, the equal protection
approach provides a workable framework. Further, the approach is theo-
retically sound. When a law would not have been enacted but for a
constitutionally impermissible purpose, that law should be declared invalid.2
As a result, the equal protection approach can and should be extended to
the establishment clause. 22 But all of this assumes an answer to the more
fundamental definitional problem: what is an impermissible religious purpose
in the context of this analysis?
16. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980).
17. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
18. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987); cf. id. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring)
("A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The
religious purpose must predominate.").
19. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-68, 270 n.21 (1977). The precise judicial inquiry, including the allocation of burdens of
proof, varies by context. See generally Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989) (arguing that these context-based differences conceal a balancing
of competing interests).
20. Such a racially discriminatory law or governmental action is not per se unconstitutional,
but it is tested against a standard of extremely strict judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
21. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. RaV. 95, 116-18.
22. See Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's
Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 908-11 (1987).
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B
To discern the character of an "impermissible religious purpose," one
first must discern the character of "religious." The definition of "religious"
is a complex problem, but only at the margins. I need not confront that
problem here, for I mean to address that which is indisputably religious.
In particular, I mean to address a form of thinking that is religious in the
traditional, typically theistic, sense-a form of thinking that is characterized,
at least in part, by spiritual or otherworldly concerns, including concerns
about the will of God.Y
So understood, religious thinking necessarily includes a spiritual compo-
nent. Yet it frequently concerns the here-and-now as well. This gives rise
to two distinct sorts of religious purpose, either of which might form the
predicate for legislation or other governmental action. A "spiritual" reli-
gious purpose addresses itself directly to the spiritual. A "worldly" religious
purpose, by contrast, addresses worldly concerns on the basis of beliefs that
are spiritual in nature.
As with the definition of "religious," the line between spiritual and
worldly religious purposes can be difficult to draw. 24 But here again, the
close definitional questions can wait for another day. At least in the context
of governmental action, most religious purposes are easily classified as
spiritual or worldly.
When a governmental action consists of prayer or other devotional activity
or when it attempts to mandate, encourage, or support such activity by
individuals, the government's purpose is spiritual in nature. Governmental
sponsorship of devotional exercises in the public schools provides a classic
example?5 Other examples include official proclamations of spiritual beliefs,
23. Professor Stanley Ingber has suggested that the term "religious" essentially should be
restricted to this form of thinking and that "religion" should be defined accordingly for both
establishment and free exercise purposes: "It is the role played by the sacred or the divine
that separates religions from other belief systems (i.e., ideologies) for legal purposes. Although
not necessarily bound by any theistic precept, religious duties must be based in the 'other-
worldly' or the transcendent .... ." Ingber, Religion or Ideology. A Needed Clarification of
the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 285-86 (1989) (footnotes omitted). I am sympathetic
to this definition, but not to Ingber's further suggestion that such religious duties necessarily
"are not matters of human debate, evaluation, or judgment." Id. at 333. See infra notes 54-
56 and accompanying text. In any event, my limited focus permits me to avoid the type of
comprehensive definition that Ingber advances.
24. Cf. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision,
67 TEx. L. Rv. 955, 1003 (1989) ("Nearly all religious beliefs and practices have temporal
consequences and implications that attract favor for earthly reasons.").
25. The Supreme Court declared such sponsorship unconstitutional in Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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such as "In God We Trust" 26 or "one nation under God"; 27 governmental
sponsorship of devotional religious symbols; 28 publicly funded legislative
prayer;29 and other publicly funded religious worship or spiritual instruc-
tion.3 0
A worldly religious purpose also is grounded in spiritual beliefs, typically
beliefs concerning the will of God, but its immediate concern is nonspiritual
human behavior in the physical world. Thus, for example, to honor God's
will by restricting abortion or by adopting regulations to protect the envi-
ronment would be to further a worldly religious purpose."
C
Given these understandings of "religious purpose," what should be re-
garded as an "impermissible religious purpose"? This depends on the
constitutional principles that this concept should be read to reflect.
One could argue that all religious purposes should be regarded as imper-
missible-that religious thought should be categorically excluded from the
lawmaking process. 32 It seems plain, however, that religious thought cannot,
and should not, be categorically excluded from the lawmaking process.
Beginning with the Founding itself, the history of the United States reveals
26. 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1988) (national motto).
27. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1988) (pledge of allegiance).
28. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (applying context-
specific approach in determining whether establishment clause prohibits governmental displays
of religious symbols).
29. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (rejecting establishment clause
attack on publicly funded legislative prayer).
30. This would include the provision of public funds to religious institutions, such as
churches or religious schools, at least if any of the funds would be used to support spiritual
activities.
31. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (rejecting establishment
clause attack on abortion funding restrictions of federal Hyde Amendment).
Most laws that further worldly purposes, including my examples of abortion and environ-
mental regulation, concern nonspiritual human behavior that might be seen to cause tangible
harms, but this is not critical to my distinction. To the contrary, a religious purpose is properly
characterized as worldly as long as it regulates nonspiritual human behavior, even if only
because that behavior is regarded as sinful. See generally Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting establishment clause challenge to ban on school dances, a ban allegedly
grounded on belief that dancing is sinful), reh'g en banc denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
32. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JusaCE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980) ("[N]obody has
the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe
which is denied the rest of us."); Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations
of Citizenship, 18 PinL. & PuB. Aiu. 259, 284 (1989) ("[O]ne should not advocate or promote
any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing
to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of
reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question." (emphasis in original)).
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an inseparable connection between religion, morality, and law. 3 Many of
our laws, even our basic system of constitutional government and individual
rights, rest to a significant degree on religious understandings of the world,
of human beings, and of social relationships.
3 4
The connection between religion and law, moreover, is a contemporary
as well as a historical phenomenon. In addressing social problems, lawmak-
ers inevitably make value judgments. These judgments require a resolution
of competing claims concerning what is good and what is evil. In a society
as religious as ours, it is hardly surprising that citizens and their represen-
tatives frequently rely on religious beliefs in resolving these questions.3 5
Our society's traditional and contemporary practices necessarily inform
our constitutional character. As a result, the traditional and contemporary
prevalence of religiously motivated lawmaking strongly suggests that such
lawmaking is not categorically unconstitutional. If so, then not all religious
purposes are constitutionally impermissible.
Further, a general prohibition on religiously motivated lawmaking would
undermine the presumption of openness in the lawmaking process-the
presumption that lawmakers should be open to competing claims of knowl-
edge and should be permitted to base their decisions on whatever claims of
knowledge they find persuasive. This presumption rests on the value of an
open competition of ideas in the political arena. In making political deci-
sions, citizens and their representatives act on the basis of various sorts of
33. As two scholars recently have noted:
The Founders as a whole were deeply religious men. Religion played a vital role
in most of their lives; it influenced their beliefs and activities, their ideals and
hopes. The foundation of their modem republican philosophy was based on a
belief in God. Whatever the concepts that blended to form this republican
doctrine-the dignity of man, natural law, natural rights, the right of resistance-
all were suffused with an aura of the sacred.
Vetterli & Bryner, Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of the American Republic, in
TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: Six ESSAYS ON THE CONSTnrTON 91, 100 (N. York ed.
1988).
34. See H. BEasAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RE GION (1974); Leedes, Taking the
Bible Seriously (Book Review), 1987 Am. B. FouND. RiEs. J. 311, 320-27.
35. As Professor Mark Tushnet has written, "People at all points on the political spectrum
do in fact rely on their religious convictions in deciding to support or oppose expansion of
public responsibility for the needy, increases in public responsibility for inculcation of moral
values in the young, and a range of policies on abortion." Tushnet, Religion in Politics (Book
Review), 89 COLUM. L. Rav. 1131, 1131 (1989); see also P. BaNsoN & D. WILuiAms, RELIGION
ON CAPITOL HILL: Mvss AND RAirrims (1986) (most Senators and Representatives are religious
and are influenced by their religious beliefs); cf. M. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of
Religion and Morality in American Politics, ch. 5, at 33-34 (Nov. 1990) (manuscript on file
with Indiana Law Journal) (discussing "the essentially political nature of religion").
This is not to deny the powerful modem tendencies to privatize religion and to secularize
public discourse. See Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. EThcs & PUB. PoL'Y 419, 421-27 (1990). As a result of these tendencies, religion plays
a less prominent, and more controversial, political role than it did in the past, with religious
influences often being disavowed by political participants and criticized by outside observers.
1991]
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knowledge or beliefs-shared or contested, empirical or intuitive, intellectual
or emotional, philosophical or experiential, demonstrable or speculative.
The lawmaking process generally does not privilege certain types of beliefs
over others. Rather, it is open to all claims of knowledge, and therefore to
all citizens, whatever the basis of their beliefs. We expect the lawmaking
process to separate right from wrong and good from bad. But at least
presumptively, all claims of knowledge are permitted to compete on an
equal footing, whatever their source or general character.
D
I say "presumptively." The presumption of openness is just that, a
presumption. It can be overcome by constitutional principles that limit the
ordinary operation of the lawmaking process. The equal protection clause,
for example, forbids lawmakers from acting on the basis of racist beliefs.
So, too, the establishment clause may restrict the use of religious beliefs by
forbidding lawmakers from acting in furtherance of certain religious pur-
poses, religious purposes that are deemed to be constitutionally impermis-
sible.
Given the presumption of openness, as well as the traditional and con-
temporary influence of religion on the lawmaking process, the concept of
impermissible religious purpose cannot categorically preclude religiously
motivated lawmaking. But there may be room for a more limited concept
of impermissible religious purpose, a concept informed by constitutional
principles that are powerful enough to overcome the presumption of open-
ness. If so, these principles might provide a constitutional basis for restricting
the role of religion in the lawmaking process. I contend there are two such
principles, each of which has a distinct and independent grounding.
Principle Number 1: Absent good reason, government should not act
purposefully in a manner that disapproves the religious or irreligious beliefs
of individual citizens, whether directly or through an endorsement of com-
peting religious or irreligious beliefs. A person's religious or irreligious
beliefs stand at the core of his or her self-identity; they are who the person
is. For the government to attack these beliefs with a statement of disap-
proval, therefore, is tantamount to a psychological assault. Moreover, in a
religiously pluralistic society such as ours, when the government endorses
the religion or irreligion of some, it necessarily disapproves the religion or
irreligion of others. Thus, the government can disapprove the religious or
irreligious beliefs of individual citizens either directly or through the en-
dorsement of competing beliefs. In either case, this type of disapproval is
likely to alienate the adversely affected individuals, thereby causing damage
to the political community as well as to the individuals themselves. These
factors support the principle I have suggested, which embodies a general
prohibition on purposeful governmental action that sends religious or irre-
[Vol. 67:1
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ligious messages of endorsement or disapproval.36 Such action ordinarily
should be deemed to reflect an impermissible religious purpose.
My first principle, however, is subject to a "good reason" exception: if
the government has good reason, it may act in a manner that disapproves
the religious or irreligious beliefs of individual citizens (typically by endorsing
the religious or irreligious beliefs of other citizens). A spiritual purpose
generally will not constitute good reason, but a worldly purpose generally
will.
The potential harm from religious or irreligious messages is great, both
to individuals and to the political community itself.37 As a result, for the
government to come within the exception to my first principle, it must be
addressing a matter for which the exercise of governmental power is espe-
cially well-suited, if not essential. At least ordinarily, the exercise of gov-
ernmental power is not well-suited, much less essential, for the accomplishment
of spiritual ends. Religious individuals and groups simply have little need
for the government's assistance in fulfilling their spiritual missions. In any
event, governmental officials have no special competence in pursuing spir-
itual ends, and their action is as likely to retard as to advance the spiritual
cause that they are attempting to further. Indeed, the government's use of
coercive power actually might eliminate the spiritual value of what would
otherwise be purely voluntary acts of devotion.38
But the use of governmental power often is essential, or at least well-
suited, for the accomplishment of worldly ends, including worldly ends on
which religious thinking has much to say. The concerns of religion include
the concerns of this world-how we as humans treat each other and the
planet on which we live. In the history of the United States, religion has
played a prominent role in addressing social problems, including, for ex-
ample, the problems of slavery and racial inequality. More recently, religious
thinking has been brought to bear on the issues of poverty, abortion, and
the environment. And the use of governmental power is extremely important,
if not essential, to the resolution of these sorts of problems.
A law that embodies a religious but worldly purpose, reflecting the
religious beliefs of some, inevitably offends the religious or irreligious beliefs
36. For a much more elaborate defense of this general prohibition, see Conkle, Toward a
General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1113, 1172-82 (1988).
37. See id. at 1164-69.
38. See id. at 1180-82.
I say a spiritual purpose "generally" will not provide sufficient reason for the government
to come within the exception to my first principle, because the exercise of governmental power
is "at least ordinarily" ill-suited to such a purpose. Governmental actions that "accommodate"
the free exercise of religion by removing burdens of the government's own creation might
reflect a spiritual purpose that the government should be permitted to further. See generally
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 1. Likewise, a spiritual purpose
might be sufficient when the governmental action is not directly coercive and is supported by
long-standing tradition. See Conkle, supra note 36, at 1183-87.
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of others. This type of law endorses the approved religious beliefs, but it
disapproves competing religious or irreligious beliefs. A law requiring racial
integration on the basis of a religious but worldly purpose, for example,
disapproves the religious beliefs of those who hold that God's will does not
permit such integration, much less require it. Likewise, a religiously inspired
restriction on abortion sends a message that endorses certain religious beliefs,
but that disapproves competing beliefs. All such laws violate the general
requirement of my first principle. But because the use of governmental
power is well-suited to the achievement of the worldly ends that these laws
address, the laws fall within the exception to this principle; there is good
reason for creating the religious or irreligious offense.3 9 As a result, these
sorts of laws should not be found to rest on an impermissible religious
purpose unless they run afoul of my second, independent principle. 4°
Principle Number 2: Government should not act purposefully on the basis
of an inerrant religious belief. Even if a religious purpose falls within the
exception to my first principle, it also must be tested against the second.
In particular, a religious purpose, even if worldly, should be deemed an
impermissible religious purpose if the pertinent religious belief is inerrant
in character. A religious belief is "inerrant" if the belief is held to be
entirely beyond question, reconsideration, or debate. 4' By contrast, a "di-
alogic" religious belief is subject to question, reconsideration, and debate.
39. Professor Kent Greenawalt has suggested a further condition: that even in pursuing
worldly ends, lawmakers should rely on a religious purpose only if nonreligious, "publicly
accessible" reasons-"reasons whose relevance is generally acknowledged"-are inadequate to
resolve the issue in question. K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
24 (1988); see also id. at 56-76. If Greenawalt is right, this would reduce the scope for my
good-reason exception, but only to a modest extent. Under Greenawalt's approach, there
'would be no good reason to rely on a religious purpose if arguments based on "publicly
accessible" reasons could resolve the issue. As Greenawalt explains, however, "publicly
accessible" reasons are inadequate to resolve many of our most important and most contentious
questions of public policy. Therefore, his condition leaves much room for religiously motivated
lawmaking. See id. at 98-202. Even so, I am not convinced that we should accept Greenawalt's
condition. In particular, I am not convinced that religious arguments should necessarily be
relegated to the residual role, and therefore the second-class status, that Greenawalt's position
clearly implies. For a persuasive critique of Greenawalt's "accessibility" requirement, see
Smith, supra note 24, at 1007-15. For Greenawalt's most recent explication of his views, see
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1019 (1990). Cf. M. Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body
Politic (1991) (manuscript on file with Indiana Law Journal) (arguing that it is permissible for
lawmakers to rely on religious reasons, but only if the laws they adopt are independently
justifiable on secular grounds).
40. In discussing my first principle and its exception, I have suggested that the establishment
clause should be read to restrict the pursuit of spiritual religious purposes to a greater extent
than worldly religious purposes. This proposition may find some, albeit limited, support in
the Founding period. See Smith, supra note 24, at 969-71.
41. I thus use the phrase "inerrant religious belief" as a type of shorthand. Needless to
say, the content of the belief may or may not be free from error, but it is understood by the
believer to be inerrant.
[Vol. 67:1
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Under this approach, the particular substantive content of religious beliefs
is beside the point. Inerrant religious beliefs, like all religious beliefs,42 are
grounded in spiritual concerns. In the context of traditional, theistic religion,
these beliefs address the nature of God and the nature and content of our
human obligations to God. As my earlier discussion suggests, such obliga-
tions may be spiritual or worldly. An inerrant religious belief therefore
might address a purely spiritual matter, such as the need for prayer, or it
might address the will of God on a matter of worldly concern. And in the
latter case, the resulting political position might fall anywhere on the
conventional continuum between "liberal" and "conservative." Likewise,
the source of the inerrant religious belief might vary; it might arise from
personal prayer or contemplation, from a religious text, or from the
statements of religious leaders, such as the Roman Catholic pope or an
Islamic ayatollah.
In the United States today, the most prominent form of inerrant religious
thought is based upon a doctrine of Biblical inerrancy. In its most common
formulation, this doctrine holds that the Bible is literally true and that its
literal truths are not subject to question, reconsideration, or debate. 43 Thus,
for example, the Bible's explanation of creation, taken literally, cannot be
subjected to scientific examination, 44 nor can its descriptions of the role of
women be tested against the thinking and experiences of the modern world.
This understanding of the Bible is embraced by a surprisingly large portion
of the American population .4 But this prominent religious movement merely
represents an example of the ,religious inerrancy to which I refer. Its
particular characteristics and political positions are not important to my
argument. To the contrary, my argument applies to all types of inerrant
religious thinking, regardless of the source and whatever the political posi-
tions such thinking might support.46
42. At least as I have defined "religious" beliefs for the purpose of this essay. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
43. According to survey data, as many as 40076 of the American people believe that the
Bible is the "actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word." N. Ams~A ,
BIBLE BELIEVERS: FUNDAMENTALISTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 6 (1987); see also Gallup, Religion
in America, 480 ANNALS 167, 168 (1985) (37% of American public believes Bible should be
taken literally). A less restrictive formulation of Biblical inerrancy would agree that the Bible
is without error, but not necessarily on a literal reading.
44. According to survey data, as many as 44% of the American people believe that "God
created man pretty much in his present form at one time during the last 10,000 years." N.
AURAN, supra note 43, at 6; see also Gallup, supra note 43, at 168.
45. See supra notes 43 & 44.
46. As the example of Biblical inerrancy suggests, religious inerrancy may attach to a
source of beliefs, rather than directly to a belief as such. And if that source is subject to
differing interpretations, there may be some room for debate-within the confines of the
source-concerning the beliefs that the source inerrantly commands. Thus, for example, Biblical
inerrantists might regard the Bible as their inerrant source of beliefs, yet still disagree about
what the Bible actually means. Even if there is some room for this type of internal debate,
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Dialogic religious beliefs, no less than inerrant beliefs, can form the basis
for governmental action that violates my first principle, which generally
prohibits the pursuit of spiritual ends through laws that embody religious
messages. That first principle guards against governmental action that inflicts
needless injury to religious and irreligious individuals and to the political
community itself. These injuries do not depend on whether the religious
beliefs that animate the laws are inerrantly held, and the principle therefore
applies even when the religious beliefs are dialogic in nature.
My second principle reflects an independent concern. When government
acts on the basis of inerrant religious beliefs, it violates a core tenet of our
democratic system-that legal policies should be formulated on the basis of
a dialogic decision-making process, a process requiring an openness of mind
that religious inerrancy does not allow. 47 Governmental action based on
inerrant religious beliefs therefore should not be permitted.
Our contemporary system of government and laws has intellectual roots
in reason as well as religion. The Founders were overwhelmingly religious,
but they also were deeply influenced by the Enlightenment. The Enlight-
enment taught that divine revelation could not establish truths that were
contrary to reason. To many Enlightenment thinkers, however, revelation
remained an important supplement to reason, and religion and reason
therefore played complementary roles in the search for truth. 48 Under this
view, religion was not antagonistic to the Enlightenment unless the religion
was itself beyond the testing of reason. This was the dominant view of the
Founders. 49
More generally, as scholars recently have emphasized, the Founders were
influenced by republican as well as liberal political theory. Just as the
Enlightenment emphasized the importance of reason, republican theory
called for the use of reasoned inquiry and debate in the formulation of
governmental policies. Unlike the liberal model of competing interest groups,
the republican model urged a deliberative politics that would search for the
public good.5 0
however, beliefs derived from an inerrant source remain entirely immune from external
challenges to their validity. As a result, they raise the problems of closed-mindedness that I
discuss in the text, and they properly are regarded as inerrant religious beliefs.
47. Earlier I discussed the presumption of openness in the lawmaking process. See supra
Part II.C. (last paragraph). The notion of openness of mind is a separate but related idea.
48. See H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA xiv (1976).
49. James Madison, for example, represented "the center of the American religious
spectrum." Id. at 96. "He arrived at a consistent, lifelong defense of Christianity on the basis
both of reason and intuition, shifting gradually like many contemporaries from the first to
the second." Id.
50. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-51 (1988);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 45-48 (1985).
Republican theory, of course, is far more complex and diverse than my capsule summary
might suggest. See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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These themes of the Enlightenment and republicanism continue to influ-
ence our scheme of constitutional democracy. One obviously cannot deny
the powerful roles of liberal theory and interest group politics. Nonetheless,
even in the context of interest group politics, we expect legislators and other
officials to respond to argument as well as to political pressure. We expect
them to give reasons for their decisions,5' and the potential for reasoned
debate and criticism is always present. That potential serves as an important
check on political bargains that are ill-advised and contrary to the public
good. Indeed, our modern Constitution exudes a general principle forbidding
unreasoned governmental policies, policies that amount to "naked prefer-
ences." 52 In short, our democratic system requires a deliberative, dialogic
decision-making process, a process that at least permits the possibility that
argument will lead to a change of mind."a
Dialogic religious thinking is not inconsistent with this political tradition.
Dialogic religious beliefs, because they are religious beliefs, are grounded
in spiritual concerns. But they are not beyond challenge. Like nonreligious
beliefs, dialogic religious beliefs may be strongly held, but they are always
subject to re-examination in the light of new understandings, new evidence,
or new arguments. As a result, these religious beliefs are subject to a type
of testing that is similar to the testing of nonreligious beliefs.54
A dialogic religious belief, for example, may be put into question on the
basis of scientific evidence. If science persuasively disproves the belief, it
will be abandoned, and the religious believer will accordingly modify his or
her understanding of the world. Faced with scientific proof of evolution,
for example, many Christians and Jews have accepted a revised understand-
ing of the origins of life on earth. This type of new understanding requires
a rethinking of religious beliefs, but that need not trouble the religious
believer. Just as a person seeks knowledge in general, a search for religious
51. Even if those reasons might be drawn from the arguments of interest group lobbyists.
52. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
53. It may seem ironic to prefer uncertainty to certitude in the lawmaking process. But
the preference is only for a minimal sort of uncertainty, that is, a minimal willingness to
consider contrary argument.
54. As Professor Roger C. Cramton has written:
Every belief must be tested by one's experience, evaluated for consistency with
other beliefs that one has found useful and reliable, and compared with con-
trasting views. All great religions . . . require that we use our minds to discover
what is required of us. Being fully human is being rational as well as intuitive
and insightful. Openness to new experiences and insights, constant reformulation
of beliefs based on new knowledge, a tolerance for other views that are supported
by data or rational argument-these are the basic elements of the method by
which we can arrive at closer approximations of the truth.
Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 515 (1987). This type of
religious thinking belies "the often unstated premise of many liberal theorists that reasoning
and religious beliefs are mutually exclusive means for understanding the world." Carter,
Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 986.
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knowledge may be predicated on an open-minded search for truth, a search
that contemplates a lifelong journey of religious growth and enhanced
understanding 5
Dialogic religious beliefs that are normative in character are likewise
subject to challenge and testing. If certain passages of the Bible seem at
odds with a proper understanding of the role of women in our society, for
example, religious believers might conclude that those passages should not
be controlling. Their normative understanding of the world might thus be
changed on the basis of experience and argument, and this might affect
their sense of religious knowledge.5 6
Inerrant religious beliefs stand in stark contrast. They are the product of
a psychological process qualitatively different from other types of thinking.
To hold a belief as inerrant is to place that belief beyond the reach of
empirical evidence and conflicting normative argument. 57 This type of think-
55. Consider the view of theologian Karl Rahner:
[I]n .. . cases of conflict between theology and natural science, theology is ...
frequently compelled to reexamine itself, to understand itself better, to give way
to natural science .... In practice, therefore, there is an open relationship between
natural science and theology ....
[.. T]his pluralism of the sciences, including also theology, is not a static
reality remaining always the same, but takes the form of a task demanding a
truly historical even though asymptotic trend toward an integration and a unity.
... Faith and theology do not really give the natural sciences their right to
exist, but find them already existing and thus see that their validity must be
recognized even in the light of the very nature of the understanding of man
produced by faith; they see that they must live together with these sciences in an
open dialogue the concrete outcome of which cannot exactly be foreseen by either
side.
K. RAHNER, On the Relationship between Natural Science and Theology, in 19 THEOLOGICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 16, 20, 23 (1983).
56. Consider the comments of Professor Michael J. Perry, a Roman Catholic who describes
himself as a partisan of "Jerusalem-based" morality:
If one can participate in politics and law ... only as a partisan of particular
moral/religious convictions about the human, and if politics is and must be in
part about the credibility of such convictions, then we who want to participate,
whether as theorists or activists or both, must examine our own convictions self-
critically. We must be willing to let our convictions be tested in ecumenical
dialogue with others who do not share them. We must let ourselves be tested, in
ecumenical dialogue, by convictions we do not share. We must, in short, resist
the temptations of infallibilism.
M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 183 (1988). For Perry's
extended defense of dialogic, ecumenical religion and "ecumenical politics," see M. Perry,
supra note 35.
57. According to Jerry Falwell, for example, "It]he Bible is absolutely infallible, without
error in all matters pertaining to faith and practice, as well as in areas such as geography,
science, history, etc. The disintegration of our social order can be easily explained. Men and
women are disobeying the clear instructions God gave in His Word." J. FALWELL, LISTEN
AMERICA 63 (1980).
Many Protestant Fundamentalists believe "that every word of scripture (often as found in
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ing obviously is within the rights of religious citizens, and it may properly
guide their private behavior, whether as individuals or groups. But it should
not form the basis for lawmaking in an open democracy. Any law that is
animated by an inerrant religious purpose, therefore, should be invalid for
that reason alone. This supports the second principle that I have suggested.5 8
Bear in mind what my second principle does not say. It does not say
that those who hold inerrant religious beliefs can play no role in the
lawmaking process nor that those who hold dialogic beliefs can play an
unlimited role. My second principle focuses not on the general belief
structure of religious believers; instead, it focuses on the particular belief
on which a law is predicated. Even for the most open-minded of religious
believers, certain core beliefs may be inerrantly held. Few religious believers,
for example, would be open to argument on the question of whether God
exists. Conversely, religious believers who hold many inerrant beliefs are
likely to hold dialogic beliefs as well. The critical question is whether
governmental action is animated by a religious purpose that is grounded on
an inerrant religious belief.5 9
the King James Version) is to be taken at face value." N. AiMMRmAN, supra note 43, at 5.
For them, it is God's Word, and it contains the answer to whatever questions
they or anyone else might have. Because it is God's Word, it is complete and
true.... [Blecause God is the timeless author of every word and story, the Bible
need not be interpreted in a historical or literary context. Each word is equally
valid, and each sentence is equally timeless and useful.
... If Genesis says "day," it means twenty-four hours. If it says that man is
created in the image of God, then human beings can have nothing in common
with any lower animals....
... "Of course, when you accept the Lord, you accept the Bible, and you
accept God's Word. And if God says it, then there's really no argument."
Id. at 51-52 (emphasis in original) (quotation unattributed).
58. According to Professor Kent Greenawalt, lawmaking should not be predicated on
religious beliefs that are demonstrably in conflict with "publicly accessible" forms of reasoning.
See K. GREENAwALT, supra note 39, at 204-07. From my perspective, such a conflict would
provide important, but not definitive, evidence that the religious beliefs are inerrant in character.
More tentatively, Greenawalt also suggests that whatever their religious viewpoints, citizens
and lawmakers should remain open to "publicly accessible" forms of reasoning, although not
as a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement. See id. at 207-11, 249-50. This suggestion
moves Greenawalt in the general direction of my argument concerning inerrancy, albeit to a
limited extent and on the basis of reasons that are rather different from mine.
59. In one sense, most religious purposes may be grounded on an inerrant religious belief.
As I have suggested, most religious believers inerrantly believe that God exists, and this belief
may very well form the first link in a chain of reasoning that ultimately leads to various other
beliefs. But this type of remote inerrancy, standing alone, does not meaningfully close the
door to a dialogic consideration of specific questions of public policy. The application of my
second principle therefore should be limited to circumstances in which the inerrant beliefs are
relatively specific and play a relatively immediate causative role in the formulation of public
policy.
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To recapitulate, governmental action should be deemed invalid if it
violates either or both of my two principles. My first principle embodies a
general prohibition on the pursuit of spiritual ends through laws that embody
religious messages, because such laws are needlessly injurious to religious
and irreligious individuals and to the political community itself. Dialogic as
well as inerrant religious beliefs can form the predicate for violations of
this principle. When a religious purpose is worldly instead of spiritual, the
good reason exception to my first principle is likely to apply, which brings
my second principle into play. Under this principle, even a worldly religious
purpose is impermissible if it is based on an inerrant religious belief.
The operation of these principles can be illustrated by considering three
areas of establishment clause concern: school prayer, evolution, and abor-
tion. Governmental sponsorship of prayer in the public schools is invalid
because it violates my first principle. 60 The sponsorship of prayer endorses
the religion of some, and it thereby disapproves the religion or irreligion
of others. Because the government's purpose is spiritual as opposed to
worldly, moreover, the governmental action does not fall within my good
reason exception. The individual and community damage that results from
the governmental action is needless and constitutionally unacceptable. Gov-
ernmental sponsorship of school prayer might also violate my second
principle, which would provide an independent and alternative basis for
invalidation. This would be true if the animating religious purpose were
grounded on an inerrant religious belief, for example, an inerrant belief
that school prayer is required by the will of God. But even if the animating
religious belief were dialogic, my first principle would be sufficient to
require invalidation.
Governmental action designed to encourage the teaching of creationism
instead of evolution, by contrast, does not violate my first principle.
Although it endorses religion in a manner that otherwise would violate the
principle, it falls within the good reason exception. Such governmental
action does offend the religious and irreligious individuals who hold com-
peting beliefs. But it is important for the government, through the public
schools, to teach children about the origins of the earth and the human
species. Such teaching addresses a worldly concern-the acquisition of
knowledge about the physical world-and it may provide an essential
foundation for other types of worldly learning as well.
A governmental preference for the teaching of creationism, however,
violates my second principle, because it rests on an inerrant religious belief.
60. The Supreme Court declared such sponsorship unconstitutional in Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962), and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See also Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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In an earlier age, this might not have been so. In that age, a literal reading
of Genesis might have reflected the best available information on the origins
of the earth and humankind. If so, then the religious purpose giving rise
to such teaching might have been based on a dialogic religious belief. In
the present state of scientific knowledge, however, a literal reading of
Genesis cannot be defended by anyone willing to confront the evidence.
Governmental action designed to encourage such an understanding of cre-
ation, therefore, must be based on an inerrant religious belief, a belief that
is held to be inerrantly true and thus not subject to evidentiary refutation.
This type of governmental action violates my second principle and therefore
is unconstitutional.6 '
Whatever else it may involve, abortion is a religious issue. At the heart
of this issue are two competing interests: that of the pregnant woman and
that of her fetus. Critical to this conflict is an evaluation of the life of a
human fetus. Many religious believers contend that prenatal human life is
precious in the eyes of God, just as all human life is precious. As a result,
they believe that such life should not be extinguished, at least not in the
absence of compelling circumstances, such as a serious threat to the life or
health of the woman. The regulation of abortion therefore is likely to be
religiously motivated. As with the teaching of creationism, however, the
religious purpose is worldly, not spiritual. Although grounded in spiritual
beliefs concerning the will of God, its immediate concern is to protect
prenatal life by regulating nonspiritual human behavior in the physical
world. Unlike a spiritual purpose, moreover, the worldly purpose of pro-
tecting prenatal life is one for which the use of governmental power is
useful, if not essential. As with the teaching of creationism, the religiously
motivated regulation of abortion thus falls within the exception to my first
principle. Although it endorses certain religious beliefs and thereby disap-
61. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
that banned the teaching of evolution in the public schools. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987), the Court went one step further, invalidating a statute that, in essence,
mandated that public schools teach "creation science" alongside evolution. At first glance,
this type of statute might seem an unlikely target for invalidation under the analysis I have
suggested. After all, the statute in Edwards did not preclude the teaching of evolution, and,
at least in form, it would have permitted students a type of "dialogic" encounter with
competing theories of truth-that of evolution and that of "creation science." But at least
according to the Supreme Court, the statute in fact was designed to advance a religious
understanding of creation, an understanding that appeared to be drawn from a literal reading
of Genesis. See id. at 585-94; id. at 597-604 (Powell, J., concurring). If so, then the statute
must have been grounded on an inerrant religious belief and was indeed unconstitutional under
the analysis I have proposed. See generally Rosen, Continuing the Conversation: Creationism,
the Religion Clauses, and the Politics of Culture, 1988 SuP. CT. Rv. 61, 76 (suggesting that
Supreme Court's jurisprudence under religion clauses is designed in part to preserve "conver-
sation" and that creationist religious beliefs may "put a stop to conversation rather than
facilitating it").
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proves competing beliefs, there is good reason sufficient to justify this
endorsement and disapproval.
Whether the regulation of abortion violates my second principle depends
upon whether the religious belief that animates the regulation is inerrant in
nature. A religious belief that abortion should be restricted in a particular
way might or might not be inerrant. The American pro-life movement is
supported by many religious believers who almost surely hold inerrant beliefs
concerning this issue. But other religious opponents of abortion may base
their opposition on dialogic beliefs; they may be willing to test their position
against competing evidence and arguments. Whether a particular abortion
regulation is invalid under my second principle, therefore, depends on the
context in which it was adopted. The question is one of governmental
motivation: was the regulation motivated by a religious purpose grounded
on an inerrant belief? If so, and if that purpose was a but-for factor in
the government's decision-making process, the regulation is invalid. If not,
the regulation should not be invalidated on the ground of impermissible
religious purpose. 62
For a similar but less emotional example, one could substitute an envi-
ronmental regulation. Many religious believers contend that all life, including
nonhuman life, is precious in the eyes of God. On that basis, they may
support the protection of endangered plant and animal species. If a regu-
lation is adopted on the basis of this religious purpose, it will offend
religious and irreligious individuals who hold contrary beliefs, for example,
that human well-being should take precedence over nonhuman environmental
concerns. The religious purpose is worldly, however, and the regulation
falls within the exception to my first principle. If the religious purpose
depends upon a religious belief that is inerrantly held, the environmental
regulation should be invalidated under my second principle. But if the belief
is dialogic, the law should be upheld despite its religious purpose.
F
In upholding an abortion regulation against an establishment clause
challenge, the Supreme Court stated that a law was not invalid merely
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions."' 63 In order to uphold the law under the first prong of Lemon,
however, the Court found itself obliged to find a secular, nonreligious
motivation, so that the religious purpose could indeed be labeled "coinci-
62. I am putting aside other potential challenges to such a regulation, including challenges
based on substantive due process instead of the establishment clause. See generally infra notes
68-69 and accompanying text.
63. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 442 (1961)).
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dental." The Court suggested that the law was "as much a reflection of
'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it [was] an embodiment of the
views of any particular religion." 64 Perhaps the law was supported by a
"traditionalist" purpose that was not religious. But to require the showing
of such a nonreligious purpose is wrong, for it suggests an unjustified
hostility toward religious beliefs.
Religious beliefs are central to the lives of many Americans. 6 In the
absence of a strong justification, these individuals should not be asked to
put their religious beliefs aside when they enter the political arena, nor
should they be encouraged to contrive supposed "secular" reasons for their
political positions. 6 To say that a law cannot be based on religious beliefs
unless it also is supported by "traditionalist" values is misguided. Anyone
who cares to look can see that much of the American legal system rests on
religious values. 67 And there is no reason to pretend that those values are
somehow less legitimate than an ill-defined interest in "traditionalism."
More generally, there is no reason for an absolute prohibition on reli-
giously motivated lawmaking, and the Court's doctrine is mistaken to the
extent it suggests otherwise. A religiously motivated law, like any other law,
may violate constitutional provisions other than the establishment clause.
Thus, it may violate constitutional provisions that protect the liberties of
those whose conduct the law would regulate.68 For example, a restriction
on abortion might violate the substantive due process rights of pregnant
women. 69 But what is critical for establishment clause purposes, I submit,
64. Id. (citation omitted).
65. According to survey data, religion is "very important" to over 55% of the American
population, and if we add in those for whom religion is "fairly important," the percentage
exceeds 85%. See G. GALLUP, THE GALUP POLL: PUBLIC OPnION 1989, at 204 (1990).
66. Cf. M. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLIcs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY, supra note 56,
at 181-82 (arguing that religious convictions are self-constitutive and that "[t]o 'bracket' such
convictions is ... to bracket-to annihilate-essential aspects of one's very self").
67. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
68. See generally Garvey, A Comment on Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 1288 (1986) (suggesting that liberal democracy values certain goods, including certain
individual freedoms, and that religiously motivated lawmaking should not conflict with those
goods).
69. Under conventional constitutional doctrine, this and other individual rights issues are
resolved by balancing the governmental interests in regulation against the presumptively
protected liberty of those whose conduct is being restricted. Different individual liberties are
valued differently. This affects the strength of the presumptive constitutional protection they
receive and therefore the burden the government must bear in justifying its regulations. Thus,
the government must have especially weighty interests if it wishes to intrude on individual
liberties that are highly valued, such as the constitutionally protected "right to privacy," a
right that has conventionally been understood to protect abortion decision making.
My proposed reading of the establishment clause would not directly affect this analysis. On
the other hand, my discussion would bear on the proper evaluation of governmental interests
that are advanced to justify an intrusion on individual liberty. In particular, it would suggest
that if a law can survive the establishment clause analysis I have proposed, the interests that
the law advances should not be declared illegitimate or insubstantial merely because of their
religious underpinnings.
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is compliance with the two principles I have suggested. If a law can withstand
that scrutiny, its religious grounding should not itself be problematic. In
particular, a purpose that is religious but worldly ordinarily should not be
problematic if the religious belief is dialogic in character.7
0
III
I have advanced a normative argument concerning how we ought to
understand the purpose component of establishment clause doctrine. The
principles that I have suggested require us to distinguish religious purposes
that are spiritual from those that are worldly. They also require us to
distinguish religious beliefs that are inerrant from those that are dialogic.
According to the distinctions that I have drawn, inerrant religious beliefs
are qualitatively different from dialogic beliefs. In deciding whether govern-
mental action is grounded on an impermissible religious purpose, moreover,
this difference generally should be determinative for cases in which the
animating purpose is religious but worldly. To this extent, I have suggested
a direct and explicit abandonment of the principle of religious equality: two
types of concededly religious beliefs would be treated differently under the
establishment clause, with dialogic beliefs being preferred over inerrant
beliefs.
At least four objections might be advanced against my thesis. The first
relies on the principle of religious equality. Whatever the proper role of
religious beliefs in the lawmaking process, one might argue, all such beliefs
should be treated alike. If dialogic religious beliefs can inform a worldly
religious purpose, so too for inerrant beliefs. Conversely, if inerrant beliefs
can play no such role, dialogic beliefs should be treated the same way.7'
And as I suggested earlier, this principle of religious equality has been
strongly and consistently supported in our constitutional jurisprudence.
But no principle, even one that has come to attain an axiomatic status,
should be immunized from critical argument.7 2 I have shown that certain
religious beliefs are qualitatively different from others, and this difference
supports the distinction that I have suggested. I would emphasize, moreover,
70. As this discussion suggests, I believe that religion is a source of truth that may properly
form the basis for governmental action. By contrast, I am not contending that dialogue is
itself a source of truth.
71. Some might contend that in precluding the use of inerrant religious beliefs as the basis
for governmental action concerning worldly matters, I leave too little room for religiously
motivated lawmaking. Others might contend, to the contrary, that my argument leaves too
much room for such lawmaking by generally permitting the use of dialogic religious beliefs in
this context. Although these two positions would reflect antagonistic perspectives concerning
the propriety of religiously motivated lawmaking, both would find support in the principle of
religious equality.
72. Unless, of course, the principle is inerrant.
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that my proposed abandonment of the principle of religious equality is
limited in two important respects. First, it is limited to the particular context
that I have addressed, that of religiously motivated lawmaking. Second, it
does not draw a distinction between religions as such; instead, it calls for
attention to the particular religious beliefs that form the predicate for
lawmaking.73
A second objection would be grounded on implementational difficulties.
Thus, one might accept my basic theoretical framework but contend that
the framework is not susceptible to judicial administration. More specifi-
cally, one might argue that the distinction between inerrant and dialogic
religious beliefs is too imprecise to serve as a standard for judicial decision
making. Clearly, the line between inerrant and dialogic beliefs is difficult
to draw. At some point, a strongly held but dialogic belief becomes an
inerrant belief; to that extent, the difference may be a matter of degree.
Moreover, inerrant and dialogic belief structures and manners of argument
may be interrelated in complex ways, 74 compounding the difficulty of judicial
categorization . 7 5
My suggested distinction obviously would benefit from further refinement.
Even without refinement, however, the distinction would provide a basis
for resolving clear cases. It also would provide a general standard, supported
by a normative rationale, that could guide the resolution of closer cases.
As such, the proposed distinction seems no more vague than existing
establishment clause standards. The process of case-by-case adjudication,
moreover, might well permit the development of more precise decisional
signposts.
A third objection, likewise relating to implementational difficulties, would
focus on the required motivational inquiry. Motivational inquiries are always
73. An additional, related objection also would focus on the importance of equality, but
from a different perspective. As a matter of demographics, inerrant religious beliefs may tend
to be held more often by those in lower economic and social groupings. See N. AmmA ,
supra note 43, at 6. Thus, my argument may effectively advocate a greater role for the religion
of well-to-do and educated Americans and a lesser role for the religion of those who are poor
or undereducated. There is no precise relationship here, but I nonetheless am bothered by this
argument.
74. For example, one might think that God has inspired him or her to understand the
right answer to a political or moral problem but not be sure that God in fact has spoken.
Such a believer might not inerrantly believe in the inspired answer but still be unwilling to
engage in ordinary dialogue concerning its content. Or one might believe in Biblical inerrancy
and all the further beliefs that such inerrancy entails but at the same time be open to argument
concerning whether the Bible in fact should be understood in this fashion. In this sense, one
might dialogically believe in inerrancy.
75. These interrelationships may complicate not only the question of whether any given
beliefs should be characterized as inerrant, but also the question of how the inerrancy, if any,
may have influenced the government's decision-making process. See supra note 59 ("remote
inerrancy" should not be regarded as problematic); supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text
(discussing but-for causation requirement). These complications also create the risk of unduly
intrusive judicial examinations of religious beliefs and doctrines.
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difficult, especially when it appears that legislation is the product of multiple
motivations. My suggested framework is multi-faceted, and a court would
inevitably find itsdlf in a state of uncertain knowledge. In the face of that
uncertainty, how could a court be expected to make the various distinctions
that my argument requires? For example, how could a court determine the
but-for motivational role not merely of religion in general, but of inerrant
as opposed to dialogic religious beliefs? This, too, is a weighty objection.
Even so, motivational questions are questions of fact; like other fact
questions, they can be decided by courts on the basis of probabilities. And
I am not convinced that the motivational inquiry suggested here is substan-
tially more difficult than motivational inquiries conducted in other areas. 76
Although I have offered rebuttals to these last two objections, I cannot
deny that it would be difficult for the judiciary to implement my suggested
framework. Indeed, I am willing to assume that the judiciary might not be
willing to embrace the framework, at least not in full. Even on that
assumption, however, the proposal might have practical implications on
three different levels. First, courts might be willing to apply my analysis
when the inquiry would not be especially difficult. In some cases, the
motivational predicate for a law is relatively obvious.7 Second, my analysis
might influence judicial decision making even within the basic contours of
existing doctrine. The purpose component of the Supreme Court's existing
establishment clause doctrine is imprecise and therefore capable of flexible
application. Even without any basic change in doctrine, therefore, courts
could include factors of the sort discussed in this essay as relevant consid-
erations that might help inform their decision making. Third, my analysis
might influence nonjudicial officials who are concerned about constitutional
limitations on their decision-making power. To whatever extent my proposal
might not be judicially enforceable, it still could guide the behavior of
conscientious legislators who wished to honor establishment clause policies,
even if the courts would not require them to do so. 78
76. In the establishment clause area, as elsewhere, the Supreme Court has shown more
willingness in some cases than in others to examine legislative history in an attempt to uncover
hidden legislative motives. Compare, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-94 (1987)
(closely examining legislative history and disregarding stated legislative purpose as "sham")
with Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2371 (1990) (plurality opinion) (focusing
on "avowed" legislative purpose and stating that "what is relevant is the legislative purpose
of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law"
(emphasis in original)).
77. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (invalidating "creation science" statute as being
grounded on religious understanding of creation); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(invalidating moment-of-silence law whose legislative history clearly suggested that legislature's
purpose was to endorse prayer).
78. Legislators obviously could not question the content of any religious beliefs that they
themselves held as inerrant. But at least in some circumstances, they might decline to adopt
legislation that was predicated on such beliefs. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 39, at 1025-26
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Whether enforced by judges or through legislative self-restraint, however,
my framework is subject to a fourth and more fundamental objection.
Accepting my distinction between inerrant and dialogic religious beliefs, one
might object that this distinction is not extended to secular beliefs. A
psychology approaching inerrancy might well occur in the realm of secular
thought.7 9 If so, then to limit the lawmaking role of religious inerrancy
would provide an incomplete response to the problem. Worse still, this
incomplete response could be criticized for being hostile to religion; it would
restrict the role of religious inerrancy, but not the role of its secular
counterpart. 0
I suspect that the problem of inerrancy is more likely to arise in the
context of religious beliefs. In any event, the focus of the establishment
clause is properly limited to this context. But I might be mistaken about
the prevalence of secular inerrancy, and the establishment clause should not
be interpreted in a manner that unjustifiably prefers the secular to the
religious."'
At the outset, I characterized this essay as tentative and exploratory in
nature. My thesis is controversial, and I am troubled by the objections that
I have discussed, especially the fourth one. I have offered responses to
these objections, however, and I have presented affirmative arguments that
support the framework that I have described.
Whether my suggested framework should be adopted remains to be seen.
But whatever its immediate implications for the courts or other governmental
officials, this essay makes an observation with both theoretical and real-
world significance: religious inerrancy, a quite common form of thinking
in the United States,8 2 poses a special risk to the lawmaking process, a risk
that dialogic religion does not. More generally, the essay suggests that the
(discussing how political principles can have practical impact on use of religious convictions).
See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975) (arguing that legislators should consider constitutionality of proposed
legislation and refrain from unconstitutional enactments).
79. Cf. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 932, 942 (1989)(suggesting that nonreligious as well as religious beliefs may be held in closed-minded fashion).
80. I have no desire to tilt the public square in the secular direction. Much to the contrary,
one of the goals of this essay is to provide reasons for opening the public square to explicitly
religious, but dialogic, arguments about worldly matters. See supra Part II.F.
81. If this fourth objection has merit, it might suggest not that my thesis should be rejected,
but rather that the thesis should be extended to the secular domain. Thus, one might argue
that without regard to the establishment clause as such, the Constitution should be read to
impose a general restriction on lawmaking grounded on inerrant beliefs, whether or not
religious in nature. See generally supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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principle of religious equality should not be regarded as axiomatic. All
religions are not alike, and their differences may have important implications
for the resolution of church-state issues.
